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ABSTRACT
From network topologies to online social networks, many of
today’s most sensitive datasets are captured in large graphs.
A significant challenge facing owners of these datasets is
how to share sensitive graphs with collaborators and autho-
rized users, e.g. network topologies with network equipment
vendors or Facebook’s social graphs with academic collab-
orators. Current tools can provide limited node or edge pri-
vacy, but require modifications to the graph that significantly
reduce its utility.
In this work, we propose a new alternative in the form
of graph watermarks. Graph watermarks are small graphs
tailor-made for a given graph dataset, a secure graph key,
and a secure user key. To share a sensitive graph G with a
collaborator C, the owner generates a watermark graph W
using G, the graph key, and C’s key as input, and embeds
W into G to form G′. If G′ is leaked by C, its owner can
reliably determine if the watermark W generated for C does
in fact reside inside G′, thereby provingC is responsible for
the leak. Graph watermarks serve both as a deterrent against
data leakage and a method of recourse after a leak. We pro-
vide robust schemes for creating, embedding and extracting
watermarks, and use analysis and experiments on large, real
graphs to show that they are unique and difficult to forge.
We study the robustness of graph watermarks against both
single and powerful colluding attacker models, then pro-
pose and empirically evaluate mechanisms to dramatically
improve resilience.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many of today’s most sensitive datasets are captured in
large graphs. Such datasets can include maps of autonomous
systems in the Internet, social networks representing billions
of friendships, or connected records of patent citations. Con-
trolling access to these datasets is a difficult challenge. More
specifically, it is often the case that owners of large graph
datasets would like to share access to them to a fixed set
of entities without the data leaking into the public domain.
For example, an ISP may be required to share detailed net-
work topology graphs with a third party networking equip-
ment vendor, with a strict agreement that access to these sen-
sitive graphs must be limited to authorized personnel only.
Similarly, a large social network like Facebook or LinkedIn
may choose to share portions of its social graph data with
trusted academic collaborators, but clearly want to prevent
their leakage into the broader research community.
One option is to focus on building strong access control
mechanisms to prevent data leakage beyond authorized par-
ties. Yet in most scenarios, including both examples above,
data owners cannot restrict physical access to the data, and
have limited control once the data is shared with the trusted
collaborator. It is also the case that no matter how well ac-
cess control systems are designed, they are never foolproof,
and often fall prey to attacks on the human element, i.e. so-
cial engineering. Another option is to modify portions of the
data to reduce the impact of potential data leakages. This has
the downside of making the data inherently noisy and inac-
curate, and still can be overcome by data reconstruction or
de-anonymization attacks using external input [27]. Finally,
these schemes are hard to justify, in part because it is very
difficult to quantify the level of protection they provide.
In this work, we propose a new alternative in the form
of graph watermarks. Intuitively, watermarks are small, of-
ten imperceptible changes to data that are difficult to re-
move, and serve to associate some metadata to a particu-
lar dataset. They are used successfully today to limit data
piracy by music vendors such as Apple and Walmart, who
embed a user’s personal information into a music file at the
time of purchase/download [3]. Should the purchased music
be leaked onto music sharing networks, it is easy for Ap-
ple to track down the user who was responsible for the leak.
In our context, graph watermarks work in a similar way, by
securely identifying a copy of a graph with its “authorized
user.” Should a shared graph dataset be leaked and discov-
ered later in public domains (on BitTorrent perhaps), the data
owner can extract watermark from the leaked copy and use
it as proof to seek damages against the collaborator respon-
sible for the leak. While not a panacea, graph watermarks
can provide additional level of protection for data owners
who want to or must share their data, and perhaps encourage
risk-averse data owners to share potentially sensitive graph
data, e.g. encourage LinkedIn to share social graphs with
academic collaborators.
To be effective, a graph watermark system needs to pro-
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vide several key properties. First, graph watermarks should
be relatively small compared to the graph dataset itself. This
has two direct consequences: the watermark will be difficult
to detect (and remove) by potential attackers, and adding the
watermark to the graph has minimal impact on the graph
structure and its utility. Second, watermarks should be diffi-
cult to forge and should not occur naturally in graphs, ensur-
ing that the presence of a valid watermark can be securely
associated with some user, i.e. non-repudiation. Third, both
the embedding and extraction of watermarks should be effi-
cient, even for extremely large graph datasets with billions
of nodes and edges. Finally, our goal is to design a water-
mark system that works in any application context involv-
ing graphs. Therefore, we make no assumptions about the
presence of metadata. Instead, our system must function for
“barebones” graphs, i.e. symmetric, unweighted graphs with
no node labels or edge weights.
In this paper, we present initial results of our efforts to-
wards the design of a scalable and robust graph watermark
system. Highlights of our work can be organized into the
following key contributions.
• First, we identify the goals and requirements of a graph
watermark system. We also describe an initial design of
a graph watermark system that efficiently embeds water-
marks into and extracts watermarks out of large graphs.
Graph watermarks are uniquely generated based on a user
private key, a secure graph key, and the graph they are
applied to. We describe constraints on its applicability,
and identify examples of graphs where watermarks cannot
achieve desirable levels of key properties such as unique-
ness.
• Second, we provide a strict proof of uniqueness of graph
watermarks, showing that it is extremely difficult for at-
tackers to forge watermarks.
• Third, we evaluate our watermarks in term of distortion,
false positive, and efficiency on a wide variety of large
graph datasets.
• Fourth, we identify two attack models, describe additional
features to boost robustness, and evaluate them under real-
istic conditions.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first practi-
cal proposal for applying watermarks to graph data. We be-
lieve graph watermarks are a useful tool suitable for a wide
range of applications from tracking data leaks to data au-
thentication. Our work identifies the problem and defines an
initial groundwork, setting the stage for follow-up work to
improve robustness against a range of stronger attacks.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide background and related work
on the graph privacy problem and discuss the use of water-
mark techniques in applications such as digital multimedia
as well as graphs.
Graph Privacy. Graph privacy is a significant problem
that has been magnified by the arrival of large graphs con-
taining sensitive data, e.g. Facebook social graphs or mobile
call graphs. Recent studies [4, 27] show that deanonymiza-
tion attacks using external data can defeat most common
anonymization techniques.
A variety of solutions have been proposed, ranging from
anonymization tools that defend against specific structural
attacks, or more attack-agnostic defenses. To protect node-
or edge-privacy against specific, known attacks, techniques
utilize variants of k-anonymization to produce structural re-
dundancy at the granularity of subgraphs, neighborhoods or
single nodes [23, 46, 11, 47]. Alternatively, randomization
provides privacy protection by randomly adding, deleting,
or switching edges [10, 45]. Others partition the nodes and
then describing the graph at the level of partitions to avoid
structural re-identification [12]. Finally, other solutions have
taken a different approach, by producing model-driven syn-
thetic graphs that replicate key structural properties of the
original graph [36]. One extension of this work utilizes dif-
ferential privacy techniques to provide a tunable accuracy vs.
privacy tradeoff [37].
The goals of our work are quite different from prior work
on graph anonymization, meant to protect data before its
public release. We are concerned with scenarios where
graph data is shared between its owner and groups of trusted
collaborators, e.g. third party network vendors analyzing an
ISP’s network topology, or Facebook sharing a graph with
a small set of academic researchers. The ideal goal in these
scenarios is to ensure the shared data does not leak into the
wild. Once data is shared with collaborators, reliable tools
that can track leaked data back to its source serve as an ex-
cellent deterrent. Watermarking techniques have addressed
similar problems in other contexts, and we briefly describe
them here.
Background on Digital Watermarks. Watermarking is
the process of embedding specialized metadata into multi-
media content such as images or audio/video files [14]. This
embedded watermark is later extracted from the file and used
to identify the source or owner of the content. These systems
include both an embedding component and an extraction or
recovery component. The embedding component takes three
inputs: a watermark, the original data, and a key. The wa-
termark is embedded into the data in a way that minimizes
impact on the data, i.e. transparent letters overlaid on top
of an image. The key is used as a parameter to change the
way the watermark is embedded, usually corresponds to a
specific user, and is kept confidential by the data owner to
prevent unauthorized parties from recovering and modifying
the watermark. Extraction takes as input the watermarked
data, the key, and possibly a copy of the original data. Ex-
traction can directly produce the embedded watermark or a
confidence measure of whether it is present.
Significant work has been done in digital watermarking,
particularly image watermarking [38, 24, 5, 35, 43]. Image
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watermarking techniques can be classified into two classes
based on their working domains. The first class of water-
marks is applied to the original domain of the image, the
spatial domain. Basic techniques include modifying the least
significant bits of each image pixel on the original image to
encode the watermark [38, 24, 5]. The second class applies
watermarks to the transformed domain of the image, i.e. the
frequency domain. The original data is first transformed into
frequency domain using DCT [31], DFT [35] or DWT [43],
added a sequence of small noises to several invisible fre-
quencies, and then the result is transformed back into spatial
domain as the watermarked image. The sequence of noises
is the watermark, and can be extracted by carrying out the
reverse process on the watermarked image.
Watermark techniques are already widely used today to
protect intellectual property. Watermark techniques [29, 30]
have been studied to protect the abuse of digital vector maps.
Like image watermarks, these techniques can be classified as
spatial domain methods and transformed domain methods.
Unlike image watermarks, the spatial domain methods em-
bed watermarks by modifying vertex coordinates [29], while
the transformed domain methods tend to transform vector
maps into a different frequency domain, such as the mesh-
spectral domain [30]. Watermarks have also been used to
protect software copyrights, by adding spurious execution
paths in the code that would not be triggered by normal in-
puts [7, 40]. These execution paths are embedded as extra
control flows between blocks of code, and are triggered (or
extracted) by either locating the code, or running the pro-
gram with a special input that triggers the alternate execu-
tion paths. Moreover, algorithms have been proposed for
watermarking relational datasets [1, 22, 13]. Much of this
has focused on modifying numeric attributes of relations, re-
lying on the primary key attribute as indicator of watermark
locations, assuming that the primary key attribute does not
change. Finally, watermarks, in the form of minute changes,
have been applied to protect circuit designs in the semicon-
ductor industry [32, 42].
3. GOALS AND ATTACK MODELS
To set the context for the design of our graph watermark
system, we need to first clearly define the attack models we
target, and use them to guide our design goals.
Graph watermarks at a glance. At a high level,
we envision the graph watermark process to be simple and
lightweight, as pictured in Figure 1. Embedding a water-
mark involves overlaying the original graph dataset (G) with
a small subgraph (W ) generated using the original graph and
a secret random generator seed (Ω). Embedding the water-
mark simply means adding or deleting edges between ex-
isting nodes in the original graph G, based on the water-
mark subgraph W . Each authorized user i receives only a
watermarked graph customized for them, generated using a
random seed Ωi securely associated with her. The seed is
generated through cooperation of her private key and a key
Ω
(a) Embedding
Ω1
. . .
Ω2
Ω3
+
Search
. . .
(b) Extraction
Figure 1: Embedding and extracting graph watermarks.
Ω is a secret random generator seed produced using the
secure graph key and user’s private key.
securely associated with the original graph.
If and when the owner detects a leaked version of the
dataset, the owner takes the leaked graph, and “extracts the
watermark,” by iteratively producing all known watermark
subgraphs Wi associated with G and each of the seeds Ωi
associated with an authorized user. The “extraction” process
is actually a matching process where the data owner can con-
clusively identify the source of the leaked data, by locating
the matching Wi in the leaked graph.
In our model of potential attackers and threats, we assume
that attackers have access to the watermarked graph, but not
the originalG. Clearly, if an attacker is able to obtain the un-
altered G, then watermarks are no longer necessary or use-
ful.
Attack Models. The attackers’ goal is to destroy or re-
move graph watermarks while preserving the original graph.
Watermarks are designed to protect the overall integrity of
the graph data. Thus we do not consider scenarios where the
attackers sample the graph or distort it significantly in order
to remove the watermark. Doing so would be analogous to
removing a portion of all pixels from a watermarked video,
or applying a high pass frequency filter to watermarked mu-
sic. Under these constraints, we consider two practical at-
tack models below.
• Single Attacker Model. For a single attacker with access
to one watermarked graph, it will be extremely difficult to
detect the watermark subgraph. Without the key associated
with another user, forging a watermark is also impractical.
Instead, their best attack is to disrupt any potential water-
marks by making modifications, i.e. add or delete nodes or
edges.
• Collusion Attack Model. If multiple attackers join their ef-
forts, they can recover the orginal graph by comparing mul-
tiple watermarked graphs, identifying the differences (i.e.
watermarks), and removing them.
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Design Goals. These attack models help us define the key
characteristics required for an effective graph watermarking
system.
• Low distortion. The addition of watermarks should have
a small impact on overall structure of the original graph.
This preserves the utility of the graph datasets.
• Robust to modifications. Watermarks should be robust to
modification attacks on watermarked graphs, i.e. water-
marks should remain detectable and extractable with high
probability, even after the graph has been modified by an
attacker.
• Low false positives. It is extremely unlikely for our sys-
tem to successfully identify a valid watermarkWi in an un-
watermarked graph or a graph watermarked by Wj where
i 6= j. When we embed a single watermark (Section 4), we
also refer to this property as watermark uniqueness.
Within the constraints defined above, designing a graph
watermark system is quite challenging, for several reasons.
First, the subgraph that represents the watermark must be
relatively “unique,” i.e. it is highly unlikely to occur natu-
rally, or intentionally through forgery. A second, contrasting
goal is that the watermark should not change the underly-
ing graph significantly (low distortion), or be easily detected.
Walking the fine line between this and properties of “unique-
ness” likely means we have to restrict the set of graphs which
can be watermarked, i.e. for some graphs, it will be impos-
sible to find a hard to detect watermark that does not occur
easily in graphs. Finally, since any leaked graph can have all
metadata stripped or modified, watermark embedding and
extraction algorithms must function without any labels or
identifiers. Note that the problem of subgraph matching is
known to be NP-complete [8].
4. BASIC WATERMARK DESIGN
We now describe the basic design of our graph watermark-
ing system. The basic design seeks to embed and extract wa-
termarks on graphs to achieve watermark uniqueness while
minimizing distortion on graph structure. Our design has
two key components:
• Watermark embedding: The data owner holds a graph
key KG associated with a graph G known only to her.
Each user i generates its public-private cryptographic key
pair < Kipub,Kipriv > through a standard public-key algo-
rithm [25], where Kipub is user i’s public key and Kipriv is
its corresponding private key. To share the graph G with
user i, the system combines input from user i digital signa-
ture Kipriv(T ) and graph key KG to form a random gen-
erator seed Ωi, and use Ωi to generate a watermark graph
Wi for graph G. The system embeds Wi into G by select-
ing and modifying a subgraph of G that contains the same
number of nodes as Wi. The resulting graph GWi is given
to user i as the watermarked graph.
• Watermark extraction: To identify the watermark in G′,
we use Ωi to regenerate Wi and then search for the exis-
tence of Wi within G′, for each user i.
In this section, we focus on describing the detailed proce-
dure of these two components. We present detailed analysis
on the two fundamental properties of graph watermarks, i.e.
uniqueness and detectability in Section 5.
4.1 Watermark Embedding
The most straightforward way to embed a watermark is
to directly attach the watermark graph to the original graph.
That is, if Wi represents the watermark graph for user i, and
G represents the original graph to be watermarked, the em-
bedding treats Wi as an independent graph, and adds new
edges to connect Wi to G. However, this approach has
two disadvantages. First, direct graph attachment makes
it easy for external attackers to identify and remove Wi
from G without using graph key KG and user i’s signature
Kipriv(T ). New edges connecting Wi and G must be care-
fully chosen to reduce the chance of detection, and this is a
very challenging task. Second, attaching a (structurally dif-
ferent) subgraph Wi directly to a graph G introduces larger
structural distortions.
Instead, we propose an alternative approach that embeds
the watermark graph “in-band.” That is, the embedding pro-
cess first selects k nodes (k is the number of nodes in Wi)
from G and identifies S, the corresponding subgraph of G
induced by these k nodes. It then modifies S using Wi with-
out affecting any other nodes in G. Because the watermark
graph Wi is naturally connected with the rest of the graph,
both the risk of detection and amount of distortion induced
on the original graph G are significantly lower than those of
the direct attachment approach.
We now describe the details of “in-band” watermark em-
bedding, which consists of four steps: (1) generating ran-
dom generator seed Ωi from user i’s signatureKipriv(T ) and
graph key KG; (2) generating the watermark graphWi from
the seed Ωi; (3) selecting the placement ofWi onG by pick-
ing k nodes from G and identifying the corresponding sub-
graph S induced by these k nodes; and (4) embedding Wi
into G by modifying S to match structure of Wi.
Step 1: Generating random generator seed Ωi. To gen-
erate an unforgetable watermarked graph, we generate a ran-
dom generator seed Ωi [9] using user i’s signatureKipriv(T )
and graph key KG.
Suppose the system intends to generate a watermarked
version of graph G at time T to share with a specific user
i. We begin by first sending user i with the current times-
tamp T . User i responds with its signature Kipriv(T ), by
encrypting the timestamp with its private key Kipriv . Before
proceeding further, we validate the resultKipriv(T ) to ensure
it is from i, by decrypting it with user i’s public keyKipub. If
the timestamps match, we combine the signature Kipriv(T )
and the graph key KG to form the seed of the random graph
generator for user i, Ωi. A mismatch may indicate that user
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i is a potential malicious user.
Note that Ωi cannot be formed alone by the data owner
who only holds the graph key KG, or by user i who only
owns its private key Kipriv . Therefore, results computed us-
ing seed Ωi, including the random graphWi generated (Step
2) and the choice of graph nodes to mark (Step 3), cannot
be derived independently by the data owner or identified by
user i.
Step 2: Generating the watermark graph Wi. We gen-
erate Wi as a random graph with edge probability of p and
node count k (k << n where n is the number of nodes in
G). The random edge generator uses Ωi as the seed [9]. The
k nodes of Wi are ordered as {v1, v2, ..., vk}.
The key factor in this step is choosing the node count k
and the edge probability p. As we will show in Section 5.1,
the two parameters must satisfy the following requirement
to ensure watermark uniqueness:
k ≥ (2 + δ) logq n (1)
where q = 1max (p,1−p) and δ is a constant> 0. Furthermore,
it is easy to prove that p = 12 minimizes the node count k and
the average edge count p ·
(
k
2
)
of the watermark graph Wi.
Intuitively, using a compact watermark graph not only re-
duces the amount of distortion toG, but also improves its ro-
bustness against malicious attacks. Therefore, we configure
p = 12 and therefore k = (2+δ) log2 n. This produces a rea-
sonably sized watermark graph (k <100) even for extremely
large graphs, e.g. the complete Facebook social graph (∼1
billion nodes in 2014).
Step 3: Selecting the watermark placement on graph G.
Next, we identify k nodes fromG and its corresponding sub-
graph S to embed the watermark graph. To ensure reliable
extraction, we must choose these k nodes carefully, meeting
these two requirements. First, using Ωi generated in Step
1, the k nodes must be chosen deterministically and remain
distinguishable from the other nodes of G. Second, the set
of the k nodes chosen for different watermarks (or different
Ωi values) must be easily distinguishable from each other to
reinforce watermark uniqueness. Our biggest challenge in
meeting these requirements is that we cannot use node IDs to
distinguish nodes from each other. Node IDs or any type of
metadata can be easily altered or stripped by attackers before
or after leaking G′, thereby making extraction impossible.
We address this challenge by using local graph structure
around each node as its “label.” Specifically, we define a
node structure description (NSD) as a distinguishable fea-
ture of each node. A node v’s NSD is represented by an
array of v’s sorted neighbor degrees. For example, if node v
has three neighbors with node degrees 2, 6, 4, respectively,
then v’s NSD label is “2-4-6.” We then hash v’s NSD la-
bel into a numerical value using a secure one-way hash e.g.
SHA-1 [34], and refer to the result as node v’s NSDhash.
Next, we use Ωi as the seed to randomly generate k hash
values, and use each as an index (e.g. using a mod function)
to identify a node in G. It is possible that multiple nodes
have the same NSDhash, i.e. a collision. If this happens,
we resolve the collision by using Ωi again as an index into a
sorted list of these nodes with the same NSDhash. The nodes
can be sorted by any deterministic order, e.g. node IDs in
the original graph. Note that this process is only required for
embedding (and not extraction), so any deterministic order
chosen by the graph owner will suffice.
At the end of this step, we obtain k ordered nodes from
G, X = {x1, x2, ..., xk}, and the corresponding subgraph
S = G[X ] induced by the node set X on G.
Step 4: Embedding the watermark graph Wi into graph
G. In this step, we embed the watermark graph Wi by
modifying the subgraph S = G[X ] to match Wi. Specif-
ically, we match each (ranked) node in Wi, {v1, v2, ..., vk}
with the corresponding node in S (or X), {x1, x2, ..., xk},
i.e. f : W → S, f(vi) = xi. And once the nodes are
mapped, we then apply an XOR operation on each edge of
the two graphs. That is, we consider the connection between
(vi, vj) or (xi, xj) as one bit, i.e. an edge between (vi, vj)
or (xi, xj) means 1 and no edge between (vi, vj) or (xi, xj)
means 0. If an edge (vi, vj) exists in Wi, we modify the
corresponding edge value in S from (xi, xj) to (xi, xj)⊕ 1;
and if no edge (vi, vj) exists in Wi, we modify the edge
value (xi, xj) to (xi, xj)⊕ 0. When the above edge modifi-
cation process ends, we also explicitly create edges between
nodes xi and xi+1 to maintain a connected subgraph. As
a result, we transfer the subgraph S into SWi with the wa-
termark graph Wi embedded. The reason for choosing the
XOR operation is that it allows the same watermark to be
embedded in the graph multiple times (at multiple locations),
thus reducing the risk of the watermark being detected and
destroyed by attacks such as frequent subgraph mining. We
will discuss this in more details in Section 6.
At the end of this step, we obtain a watermarked graph
GWi for user i. Before we distribute it to user i, we
anonymize GWi by completely (randomly) reassigning all
node IDs. Such anonymization not only helps to protect
user privacy, but also minimizes the opportunity for collud-
ing attackers with multiple watermarked graphs to identify
the embedded watermark (see Section 6).
4.2 Watermark Extraction
The watermark extraction process determines if a water-
mark graph Wi is embedded in a target graph G′. If so, then
G′ is a legitimate copy distributed to user i. The extraction
process faces two key challenges. First, the target graph G′,
likely a watermarked version of the original graph G, can
easily be modified by users/attackers during the graph distri-
bution process. In particular, all node IDs can be very differ-
ent from that of the original G. Thus extraction cannot rely
on node IDs in G′. Second, identifying whether a subgraph
exists in a large graph is equivalent to a subgraph match-
ing problem, known to be NP-complete. To handle massive
graphs, we need a computationally efficient algorithm.
Our design addresses these two challenges by leveraging
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knowledge on the structure of the subgraph where the wa-
termark was embedded. This eliminates the dependency on
node IDs while significantly reducing the search space dur-
ing the subgraph matching process. We describe our pro-
posed design in detail below.
Step 1: Regenerating the watermark. The owner per-
forms the extraction, and has access to the original graph G,
graph keyKG, and user’s signatureKipriv(T ). For each user
i, we combine its signature Kipriv(T ) and graph key KG to
generate the random generator seed Ωi for that user. Then,
we follow step 2 − 4 described in Section 4.1 to regenerate
the watermark graph Wi, identify the k ordered nodes from
G and their NSD labels, and finally the modified subgraph
SWi that was placed on a “clean” version of the watermarked
graph GWi .
Step 2: Identifying candidate watermark nodes on G′.
Given the k nodes X = {x1, x2, ..., xk} identified from the
original graph G, in this step we need to identify for each
xj , a set of candidate nodes on the target graph G′ that can
potentially become xj . We accomplish this by identifying
all the nodes on G′ whose NSD labels are the same of xj in
the “clean” version of the watermarked graph GWi . Since
multiple nodes can have the same NSD label, this process
will very likely produce multiple candidates. To shrink the
candidate list, we examine the connectivity between candi-
date nodes of X on G′ and compare it to that among X on
GWi . If two nodes xm and xn are connected in GWi , we
prune their candidate node lists by removing any candidate
node of xm that has no edge with any candidate node of xn
on G′ and vice versa. This pruning process dramatically re-
duces the search space. After this step, we obtain for each
xi the candidate node list Ci on the target graph G′.
Step 3: Detecting watermark graph SWi on G′. Given
the candidate node list of each node in X , we now search
for the existence of SWi on the target graph G′. For this
we apply a recursive algorithm to enumerate and prune the
combinations of the candidate sets, until we identify SWi
or exhaust all the node candidates. The detailed algorithm
is listed in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, we use a node
list Y to record the list of nodes in G′ which we have
already finalized as the corresponding nodes in SWi , i.e.
Y = {y1, y2, ..., ym} (m ≤ k). When the process starts,
Y = ∅, m = 0.
Discussion. The above design shows that our watermark
extraction algorithm simplifies the subgraph search problem
by restricting it to a small number of selected nodes from
a graph, thus avoiding the NP-complete subgraph matching
problem. Also note that we target real graphs with very high
levels of node heterogeneity, e.g. small-world, power-law or
highly clustered graphs, which are very far from the uniform,
lattice-like graphs that are the worst case scenarios for graph
isomorphism. In practice, our system can efficiently extract
watermarks from real, million-node graphs, and do so in a
few minutes on a single commodity server (Section 7.3).
Algorithm 1 Recursive Algorithm for Detecting SWi onG′.
1: Function: SubgraphDetection(G′ , SWi , {C1, C2, ...,Ck}, Y , m)
2: Input: Graph G′, watermark graph SWi , candidate node list Ci for
each node xi in X , identified node list Y = {y1, y2, ..., ym} (m < k)
3: Output: Identified node list Y
4: for each node c ∈ Cm+1 do
5: if c 6∈ Y and each edge (c, yt) in G′ (t = 1..m) is the same as the
edge (xm+1, xt) in SWi (t = 1..m) then
6: Y = Y ∪ c
7: m = m+ 1
8: if m == k then
9: Return Y
10: else
11: SubgraphDetection(G′ , SWi , {C1, C2, ...,Ck},Y , m)
12: end if
13: Y = Y \ c
14: m = m− 1
15: end if
16: end for
17: Return Y
5. FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES
Having described the basic watermark system, we now
present detailed analysis on its two fundamental proper-
ties: watermark uniqueness where each watermark must be
unique to the corresponding user, and watermark detectabil-
ity where the presence of a watermark should not be easily
detectable by external users without the knowledge of the
seed Ωi associated with user i.
5.1 Watermark Uniqueness
As a proof of ownership, each embedded watermark
should be unique for its user. That is, given the original
graph G and the seed Ωi associated with user i, the em-
bedded watermark graph SWi should not be isomorphic to
any subgraph of GWj (i 6= j) where GWj is the water-
marked graph for user j. At the same time, SWi should not
be isomorphic to any subgraph of the original graph G. In
the following, we show that with high probability, our pro-
posed graph watermark system produces unique watermarks
for any graph G.
THEOREM 1. Given a graph G with n nodes, let k ≥
(2 + δ) log2 n for a positive constant δ > 0. We apply the
following process to create a watermarked graph GWi for
user i:
• We create k nodes, V = {v1, v2, ..., vk}, and generate a
random graph Wi on V with an edge probability of 12 .
• We randomly select k nodes,X = {x1, x2, ..., xk} fromG,
and identify the subgraph corresponding to these k nodes
S = G[X ].
• Using Wi, we modify S as follows: we first map each
node xi in X to a node vi in V . Let e(u, v) = 1 denote an
edge exists between node u and v and e(u, v) = 0 denote
otherwise. We modify each e(xi, xj) in S to e(xi, xj) ⊕
e(vi, vj). We then explicitly connect nodes xi and xi+1,
i.e. e(xi, xi+1) = 1. The resulting S now becomes SWi ,
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Table 1: Suitability of watermarking for 48 of today’s network graphs, determined by comparing their node degree dis-
tribution [Nmin(G), Nmax(G)] and k-node subgraph density [Dmin(k), Dmax(k)] to those of the embedded watermark
graphs. 35 out of these 48 graphs are suitable for watermarking.
Graph Graph # of Nodes # of Edges Avg. Deg. k Node Degree Criterion k-node Subgraph Density Criterion SuitabilityCategory (k + 1)/2 [Nmin(G), Nmax(G)] Watermark [Dmin(k), Dmax(k)]
Facebook
Russia 97,134 289,324 6.0 39 20 [1, 748] 390 [45, 701] Yes
L.A. 603,834 7,676,486 25.4 45 23 [1, 2141] 517 [44, 975] Yes
London 1,690,053 23,084,859 27.3 48 24 [1, 1483] 588 [47, 1128] Yes
Epinions (1) 75,879 405,740 10.7 38 19 [1,3044] 370 [47,649] Yes
Slashdot (08/11/06) 77,360 507,833 13.1 38 19 [1, 2540] 370 [38, 668] Yes
Twitter 81,306 1,342,303 33.0 38 19 [1, 3383] 370 [44, 703] Yes
Other Slashdot (09/02/16) 81,867 497,672 12.2 38 19 [1, 2546] 370 [38, 669] Yes
Social Slashdot (09/02/21) 82,140 500,481 12.2 38 19 [1, 2548] 370 [38, 669] Yes
Networks Slashdot (09/02/22) 82,168 543,381 13.2 38 19 [1, 2553] 370 [38, 673] Yes
GPlus 107,614 12,238,285 227.5 39 20 [1, 20127] 389.5 [53, 741] Yes
Epinions (2) 131,828 711,496 10.8 40 20 [1, 3558] 409.5 [51, 780] Yes
Youtube 1,134,890 2,987,624 5.3 47 24 [1, 28754] 563.5 [47, 815] Yes
Pokec 1,632,803 22,301,964 27.3 48 24 [1, 14854] 587.5 [47, 979] Yes
Flickr 1,715,255 15,555,041 18.1 48 24 [1, 27236] 588 [51, 1128] Yes
Livejournal 5,204,176 48,942,196 18.8 52 26 [1, 15017] 689 [51, 1326] Yes
Citation Patents 23,133 93,468 8.1 34 17 [1, 280] 297 [37, 373] Yes
Networks ArXiv (Theo. Cit.) 27,770 352,304 25.4 34 17 [1, 2468] 297 [36, 534] Yes
ArXiv (Phy. Cit.) 34,546 420,899 24.4 35 18 [1, 846] 314.5 [36, 544] Yes
ArXiv (Phy.) 12,008 118,505 19.7 32 16 [1, 491] 263.5 [45, 496] Yes
Collaboration ArXiv (Astro) 18,772 198,080 21.1 33 17 [1, 504] 280 [37, 528] Yes
Networks DBLP 317,080 1,049,866 6.6 43 22 [1,343] 472.5 [43,903] Yes
ArXiv (Condense) 3,774,768 16,518,947 8.8 51 26 [1, 793] 663 [50,1063] Yes
Communication Email (Enron) 36,692 183,831 10.0 35 18 [1,1383] 314.5 [43,515] Yes
Networks Email (Europe) 265,214 365,025 2.8 42 21 [1,7636] 451 [74,683] Yes
Wiki 2,394,385 4,659,565 3.9 49 25 [1, 100029] 612 [65, 1066] Yes
Stanford 281,903 1,992,636 14.1 42 21 [1,38625] 451 [66,861] Yes
Web NotreDame 325,729 1,103,835 6.8 43 22 [1,10721] 472.5 [60,903] Yes
graphs BerkStan 685,230 6,649,470 19.4 45 23 [1,84230] 517 [79,990] Yes
Google 875,713 4,322,051 9.9 46 23 [1, 6332] 540 [72, 1033] Yes
Location based Brightkite 58,228 214,078 7.4 37 19 [1,1134] 351 [41,665] Yes
OSNs Gowalla 196,591 950,327 9.7 41 21 [1,14730] 430 [44,723] Yes
Oregon (1) 11,174 23,409 4.2 31 16 [1,2389] 247.5 [95,352] Yes
AS Oregon(2) 11,461 32,730 5.7 32 16 [1,2432] 263.5 [79,476] Yes
Graphs CAIDA 26,475 53,381 4.0 34 17 [1,2628] 297 [113,436] Yes
Skitter 1,696,415 11,095,298 13.1 48 24 [1, 35455] 588 [52, 1128] Yes
Gnutella (02/08/04) 10,876 39,994 7.4 31 16 [1,103] 247.5 [30,80] No
Gnutella (02/08/25) 22,687 54,705 4.8 34 17 [1,66] 297 [0,0] No
P2P networks Gnutella (02/08/24) 26,518 65,369 4.9 34 17 [1,355] 297 [0,44] No
Gnutella (02/08/30) 36,682 88,328 4.8 35 18 [1,55] 314.5 [35,70] No
Gnutella (02/08/31) 62,586 147,892 4.7 37 19 [1, 95] 351 [39,76] No
Amazon (03/03/02) 262,111 899,792 6.9 42 21 [1,420] 451 [88,132] No
Amazon Amazon (2012) 334,863 925,872 5.5 43 22 [1,549] 472.5 [0,0] No
Co-purchasing Amazon (03/03/12) 400,727 2,349,869 11.7 43 22 [1,2747] 472.5 [52,285] No
Networks Amazon (03/06/01) 403,394 2,443,408 12.1 43 22 [1, 2752] 473 [52, 333] No
Amazon (03/05/05) 410,236 2,439,437 11.9 43 22 [1,2760] 472.5 [50,333] No
Road Pennsylvania 1,088,092 1,541,898 2.8 47 24 [1,9] 563.5 [0,0] No
Networks Texas 1,379,917 1,921,660 2.8 47 24 [1,12] 563.5 [0,0] No
California 1,965,206 2,766,607 2.8 49 25 [1, 12] 612 [0, 0] No
and the resulting G becomes GWi .
Let GWl denote a watermarked graph for user l (l 6= i),
built using a different seed Ωl. Then with low probability,
any subgraph of GWl or G is isomorphic to SWi .
PROOF. We first show that with low probability, any sub-
graph of GWl is isomorphic to SWi . Let Y = {y1, y2, ...yk}
be a set of ordered nodes in GWl , where each yi maps to a
node xi in X . We define an event EY occurs if the subgraph
GWl [Y ] is isomorphic to GWi [X ] or SWi . Then the event E
representing the fact that there exists at least one subgraph
on GWl that is isomorphic to SWi is the union of events EY
on all possible Y , i.e. E = ∪Y EY .
Next, we compute the probability of event E by those
of individual event EY . Specifically, we first show that
the probability of an edge exists between node xi and xj
(j 6= i + 1) in SWi = GWi [X ] is 12 . This is because each
edge in the random graph Wi is independently generated
with probability 12 . After performing the XOR operation be-
tween Wi and S, the probability of an edge exists between
xi and xj (j 6= i+ 1) on Swi is 12 · pij + (1 − pij) · 12 = 12
where pij is the probability that an edge exists between xi
and xj on S. Thus the result of XOR between Wi and S is
also a random graph, and its edge generation is independent
of that inGWl , l 6= i. Furthermore, it is easy to show that our
design applies XOR operations on
(
k
2
)
− (k − 1) node pairs
on the k nodes, and each node pair has an edge with a prob-
ability of 12 . Thus, the probability of a subgraph G
Wl [Y ]
being isomorphic to SWi is P (EY ) = 12
(k2)−(k−1) · β where
β ≤ 1 is the probability that every (yi, yi+1) pair in GWl [Y ]
7
is connected. Thus P (EY ) ≤ 12
(k2)−(k−1)
.
Since E = ∪Y EY and there are less than nk possible sets
of k ordered nodes in GWl , we use the Union Bound to com-
pute the probability of event E as follows:
P (E) < nk · P (EY ) ≤ n
k ·
1
2
(
k
2
)
−(k−1)
= 2
k2
2+δ ·
1
2
k2−3k
2
+1
=
1
2
δk2
2(2+δ)
−
3k
2
+1
(2)
The above equation shows that the probability P (E) reduces
exponentially to 0 as k increases.
Finally, we can apply the same method to show that with
low probability, any subgraph of G is isomorphic to SWi .
This is because the XOR operations between Wi and S pro-
duce a random graph that is independent of G. This con-
cludes our proof.
5.2 Watermark Detectability
In addition to providing uniqueness, a practical water-
mark design should also offer low detectability, i.e. with
low probability each watermark gets identified by external
users/attackers. This means that without knowing the seed
Ωi associated with user i, the embedded watermark graph
SWi should not be easily distinguishable from the rest of the
graphGWi . Therefore, the detectability would depend heav-
ily on the topology of the original graph G, i.e. a watermark
graph can be well hidden inside a graph GWi if its structural
property is not too different from that of G.
In the following, we examine the detectability of wa-
termarks in terms of a graph’s suitability for watermark-
ing. This is because directly quantifying the detectability
is not only highly computational expensive1, but also lacks a
proper metric. Instead, we cross-compare the key structural
properties of SWi and G, and define G as being suitable for
watermarking if its structure properties are similar to that of
SWi , implying a low watermark detectability.
Suitability for Watermarking. To evaluate a graph’s
suitability for watermarks, we first study the key structure
property of the embedded watermark graph SWi . To guaran-
tee watermark uniqueness and minimize distortion, the wa-
termark graph SWi needs to be a random graph with an edge
probability of 12 (except for the fixed edges between xi, xi+1
node pairs), and include k = (2 + δ) log2 n nodes. Thus its
average node degree is at least (k + 1)/2 and its average
graph density is (
(
k
2
)
+ k − 1)/2.
1Each embedded watermark graph is similar to a random graph
with 1
2
edge probability. Thus the detectability is low if certain
subgraphs of G are also random graphs with similar edge probabili-
ties. Yet identifying these subgraphs (and the embedded watermark
graph) on a large graph incurs significant computation overhead.
Table 2: Size and density of subgraph on nodes with de-
gree> (k+1)/2 in each graph. Size is the number of sub-
graph nodes, and density is quantified as average edges
each node having inside the subgraph.
Graph Subgraph Watermark Graph SuitabilityNode # Avg. Deg. k Avg. Deg.
Russia 4,794 22.2 39 20.0 Yes
L.A. 196,174 49.2 45 23.0 Yes
London 562,075 56.1 48 24.5 Yes
Epinions (1) 7,083 68.7 38 19.5 Yes
Slashdot (08/11/06) 9,908 53.4 38 19.5 Yes
Twitter 34,014 60.5 38 19.5 Yes
Slashdot (09/02/16) 10,065 53.0 38 19.5 Yes
Slashdot (09/02/21) 10,105 53.2 38 19.5 Yes
Slashdot (09/02/22) 10,605 53.4 38 19.5 Yes
GPlus 68,828 347.1 39 20.0 Yes
Epinions (2) 10,363 83.5 40 20.5 Yes
Youtube 31,720 45.1 47 24.0 Yes
Pokec 564,001 53.0 48 24.5 Yes
Flickr 136,202 174.5 48 24.5 Yes
Livejournal 945,567 57.5 52 26.5 Yes
Patents 2,370 15.6 34 17.5 Yes
ArXiv (Theo. Cit.) 12,054 43.4 34 17.5 Yes
ArXiv (Phy. Cit.) 14,785 37.9 35 18.0 Yes
ArXiv (Phy.) 2,860 62.5 32 16.5 Yes
ArXiv (Astro) 6,536 42.9 33 17.0 Yes
DBLP 15,004 17.3 43 22.0 Yes
ArXiv (Condense) 178,455 16.0 51 26.0 Yes
Email (Enron) 3,481 48.2 35 18.0 Yes
Email (Europe) 1,779 44.0 42 21.5 Yes
Wiki Talk 21,253 83.1 49 25.0 Yes
Stanford 35,600 42.1 42 21.5 Yes
NotreDame 16,831 38.7 43 22.0 Yes
BerkStan 110,202 57.0 45 23.0 Yes
Google 55,431 14.8 46 23.5 Yes
Brightkite 4,586 30.8 37 19.0 Yes
Gowalla 17,946 39.3 41 21.0 Yes
Oregon (1) 264 17.1 31 16.0 Yes
Oregon(2) 579 31.0 32 16.5 Yes
CAIDA 575 16.0 34 17.5 Yes
Skitter 146,601 50.0 48 24.5 Yes
Gnutella (02/08/04) 796 5.2 31 16.0 No
Gnutella (02/08/25) 499 2.0 34 17.5 No
Gnutella (02/08/24) 709 2.7 34 17.5 No
Gnutella (02/08/30) 1,001 3.8 35 18.0 No
Gnutella (02/08/31) 1,276 3.6 37 19.0 No
Amazon (03/03/02) 3,727 2.8 42 21.5 No
Amazon (2012) 5,318 2.5 43 22.0 No
Amazon (03/03/12) 25,717 6.7 43 22.0 No
Amazon (03/06/01) 28,081 7.3 43 22.0 No
Amazon (03/05/05) 28,044 7.5 43 22.0 No
Pennsylvania 0 0 47 24.0 No
Texas 0 0 47 24.0 No
California 0 0 49 25.0 No
Given these properties of the embedded watermark, we
note that watermark node degree and density can be higher
than those of many real-world graphs, such as those listed
in Table 1. Intuitively, to ensure low detectability of such
a watermark graph, suitable graphs should include a set of
nodes (D) which are difficult to distinguish from the water-
mark nodes in term of node degree and subgraph density.
Specifically, a suitable graph dataset needs to contain a set
of nodes D with degree comparable or higher than the wa-
termark graph node degree; and the density of the subgraph
on D is at least comparable to the watermark graph den-
sity. If these two properties hold, the embedded watermark
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graph cannot be easily distinguished from D in the graph,
and therefore cannot be detected by attackers.
To capture the above intuition, we define that a graph G
is suitable for watermarking if its node degree and graph
density satisfy the following two criteria. First, the mini-
mum and maximum node degree of G, denoted as Nmin(G)
and Nmax(G) respectively, need to satisfy Nmin(G) ≤
(k + 1)/2 ≤ Nmax(G). Second, across all k-node sub-
graphs of G whose node degree expectation is greater than
(k+1)/2, the minimum and maximum graph density need to
satisfy Dmin(k) ≤ (
(
k
2
)
+ k − 1)/2 ≤ Dmax(k). Together,
these two criteria ensure that the embedded watermark graph
can be “well hidden” inside GWi .
To compute Dmin(k) and Dmax(k), we need to enumer-
ate all possible subgraphs of G, which is computationally
prohibitive for large graphs. Thus we apply a sampling
method to estimate them. To estimate Dmax(k), we iden-
tify the subgraph with the highest density using a greedy
search: starting from a randomly chosen node v1 with degree
> (k+1)/2, pick the 2nd node v2 with degree > (k+1)/2
that is connected to v1, then the 3rd node v3 with degree
> (k+1)/2 who has the most number of edges to v1 and v2.
This greedy search stops until we find k nodes. We repeat the
same process for all the nodes with degree> (k+1)/2, cre-
ating multiple subgraphs from which we calculate the den-
sity and pick the highest one. To estimate Dmin(k), we ap-
ply a similar process to locate multiple subgraphs except that
for each subgraph we locate the next node vi+1 randomly as
long as its node degree > (k + 1)/2 and it connects to at
least one of the existing nodes {v1, ...vi}.
Suitability of Real Graph Datasets. We wanted to un-
derstand how restrictive our suitability constraints were in
the context of real graph datasets available today. We con-
sider 48 real network graphs ranging from 10K nodes, 39K
edges to 5M nodes and 48M edges. These graphs repre-
sent vastly different types of networks and a wide range of
structural topologies. They include 3 social graphs generated
from Facebook regional networks matching Russia, L.A.,
and London [41]. They include 12 other graphs from on-
line social networks, including Twitter [21], Youtube [44],
Google+ [21], Slovakia Pokec [39], Flickr [26], Livejour-
nal [26], 2 snapshots from Epinions [33], and 4 snapshots
from Slashdot [19]. We also add 3 citation graphs from
arXiv and U.S. Patents [15], 4 graphs capturing collabo-
rations in arXiv [15] and DBLP [44], 3 communication
graphs generated from 2 Email networks [17, 19] and Wiki
Talk [20], 4 web graphs [18, 2], 2 location-based online
social graphs from Brightkite and Gowalla [6], 5 snap-
shots of P2P file sharing graph from Gnutella [17], 4 In-
ternet Autonomous System (AS) maps [15], 5 snapshots of
Amazon co-purchasing networks [16, 44], and 3 U.S. road
graphs [18]. The statistics of all graphs are listed in Table 1.
For all graphs, we use δ = 0.3 to ensure a 99.999% wa-
termark uniqueness, and compute and list the corresponding
value of k (from Equation 2) in Table 1. Next we list the
two criteria in terms of (k+1)/2 vs. [Nmin(G), Nmax(G)],
and (
(
k
2
)
+ k − 1)/2 vs. [Dmin(k), Dmax(k)]. If a graph
satisfies both criteria, our analytical results will hold for any
watermarks embedded on it.
We can make two observations based on results from Ta-
ble 1. First, 35 out of our 48 total graphs are suitable for
watermarking. Also note that graphs describing similar net-
works are consistent in their suitability. For example, all
15 graphs from various online social networks are suitable
for watermarks. Second, all 13 graphs unsuitable for water-
marks come from only 3 kinds of networks, i.e. Amazon
copurchasing networks, P2P networks, and Road networks.
These results in each group are self consistent. These results
support our assertion that our proposed watermarking mech-
anism is applicable to most of today’s network graphs with
low detection risk. In practice, the owner of a graph can ap-
ply the same mechanism to determine if her graph is suitable
for our watermark scheme.
To understand key properties determining whether a
graph is suitable for watermarking, we measure various
graph structrual properties, including average node degree,
node degree distribution, clustering coefficient, average path
length, and assortativity. We also consider the size and den-
sity of subgraphs on nodes with degree more than watermark
minimum average degree (k + 1)/2. Our measurement re-
sults show that the size and density of subgraphs on nodes
with degree > (k + 1)/2 are the most important properties
to determine suitability. Here, the size of these subgraphs
is the number of nodes in the subgraph, and the density of
the subgraph is measured as the average edges each node
has inside the subgraph, i.e. average degree inside the sub-
graph. As shown in Table 2, unsuitable graphs do not have
subgraphs with density to comparable to watermarks, while
subgraphs with the desired density can be found in graphs
deemed suitable. These results are consistent with our intu-
ition on quantifying suitability of watermarks.
Summary. Since the average watermark subgraph has
high node degree and density, a graph suitable for water-
marking must include a set of nodes, whose degree and sub-
graph density are comparable or even higher than watermark
subgraphs. We propose two criteria targeting at node de-
gree and subgraph density respectively to quantify whether
a graph is suitable for watermarking. We collect a large set
of available graph datasets today, and find that 35 out of 48
real graphs are suitable for watermarking. This promising
result indicates that watermark technique can be applied on
most of real networks with low probability to be identified.
6. MORE ROBUST WATERMARKS
Our basic design provides the fundamental building
blocks of graph watermarking with little consideration of
external attacks. In practice, however, malicious users can
seek to detect or destroy watermarked graphs. Here, we first
describe external attacks on watermarks, and then present
advanced features that defend against the attacks. Note that
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these improvement techniques aim to increase the cost of at-
tacks rather than disabling them completely. Finally, we re-
evaluate the watermark uniqueness of the advanced design.
6.1 Attacks on Watermarks
As discussed earlier, our attack model includes attacks
trying to destroy watermarks while preserving the topology
of the original graph. Based on the number of attackers,
attacks on watermarks fall under our two attack models: sin-
gle attacker and multiple colluding attackers. With access
to only one watermarked graph, a single attacker can modify
nodes and/or edges in the graph to destroy watermarks. With
multiple watermarked graphs, colluding attackers can per-
form more sophisticated attacks by cross-comparing these
graphs to detect or remove watermarks.
Single Attacker Model. The naive edge attack is easiest
to launch, and tries to disrupt the watermark by randomly
adding or removing edges on the watermarked graph. For
the attacker, there is a clear tradeoff between the severity
of the attack (number of edges or nodes modified), and the
structural change or distortion applied to the graph structure.
At first glance, this attack seems weak and unlikely to be
a real threat. The probability of the attacker modifying one
edge or node in the embedded watermark graph Wi is ex-
tremely low, given the relatively small size of Wi compared
to the graph. As shown later, however, this attack can be
quite disruptive in practice. By modifying a node ni or an
edge connected to ni, the attack impacts all of ni’s neighbor-
ing nodes, since their NSD labels will be modified. These
NSD label changes, while small, are enough to make locat-
ing nodes in the watermark graph very difficult. This effect
is exacerbated in social graphs that exhibit a small world
structure, since any change to a supernode’s degree will im-
pact a disproportionately large portion of nodes in the graph.
One extreme of this attack is to leak patial watermarked
graphs or merge several graphs together. With high probabil-
ity, it can destroy the embedded watermarks, but will signif-
icantly distort the graph topologies to reduce their usability.
Thus, we do not consider such scenarios in our study.
Collusion Attacks. By obtaining multiple watermarked
graphs, an attacker can compare these graphs to eliminate
watermarks. Since we anonymize each watermarked graph
by randomly reassigning node IDs (see Section 4.1), attack-
ers cannot directly match individual nodes across graphs.
To compare multiple graphs, we apply the deanonymization
methods proposed in [27, 28]. Specifically, we first match
1000 highest degree nodes between two graphs based on
their degree and neighborhood connectivities [28], and then
start from these nodes to find new mappings with the net-
work structure and the previously mapped nodes [27].
Using the deanonymization method, attackers can then
build a "cleaned” graph, where an edge exists if it exists
in the majority of the watermarked graphs. Since embed-
ded watermark graphs are likely embedded at different lo-
cations on each graph, a majority vote approach effectively
removes the contributions from watermark subgraphs, lead-
ing to a graph that closely approximates the original G.
6.2 Improving Robustness against Attacks
The attacks discussed above can disrupt the watermark
extraction process in two ways. First, adding or delet-
ing nodes/edges in G′ changes node degrees, and therefore
nodes’ NSD labels, thereby disrupting the identification of
candidate nodes during the second step of the extraction pro-
cess; second, adding or deleting nodes/edges inside the em-
bedded watermark graph SWi can change the structure of
the watermark graph, making it difficult to identify during
the third step of the extraction process. To defend against
these attacks, we must make the watermark extraction pro-
cess more robust against attack-induced artifacts on both
node and graph structure. To do so, we propose four im-
provements over the basic extraction design in Section 4.2.
Improvements #1, #2: Addressing changes to node neigh-
borhoods. Extracting a watermark involves searching
through nodes in G′ by their NSD labels. By adding or
deleting nodes/edges, attackers can effectively change NSD
labels across the graph. To address this, we propose two
changes to the basic extraction design. First, we bucketize
node degrees (with bucket size B) to reduce the sensitivity
of a node’s NSD label to its neighbors’ node degrees. For
example, with B = 5, a node with degree 9 will stay in
the same bucket even if one of its edges has been removed
(reducing its node degree to 8). Second, when selecting a
watermark node’s candidate node list, we replace the exact
NSD label matching with the approximate NSD label match-
ing. That is, a match is found if the overlap between two
bucketized NSD labels exceeds a threshold θ. For example,
with θ = 50%, a node with bucketized NSD label “1-2-3-4”
would match a node with label “1-2-3” since the overlap is
75% > θ.
These changes clearly allow us to identify more candidate
nodes for each watermark node, thus improving robustness
against small local modifications. On the other hand, more
candidate nodes lead to more computation during the sub-
graph matching step, i.e. step 3 in the extraction process.
Such expansion, however, does not affect watermark unique-
ness and detectability, since they are unrelated to the size of
candidate pools.
Improvement #3, #4: Addressing changes to subgraph
structure. Random changes made to G′ by an attacker
has some chance of directly impacting a node or edge in
the embedded watermark. To address this, we propose two
techniques. First, we add redundancy to watermarks by em-
bedding the same watermark graph Wi into m disjoint sub-
graphs S1, S2, ...Sm from the original graphG. This greatly
increases the probability of the owner locating at least one
unmodified copy of Wi during extraction, even in the pres-
ence of attacks that make significant changes to nodes and
edges in G′. Note that since we embed watermarks on dis-
joint subgraphs, this does not affect watermark uniqueness
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1−P (E). While embeddingm watermarks will impact false
positive, which is 1− (1− P (E))m.
Second, it is still possible that all the watermark graphs are
“destroyed” by the attacker and there are no matches in the
extraction process. If this happens, we replace the exact sub-
graph matching in the step 3 of the extraction process with
the approximate subgraph matching. That is, a subgraph
matches the watermark graph if the amount of edge differ-
ence between the two is less than a threshold L. By relaxing
the search criteria used in step 3 of the extraction process,
this technique allows us to identify “partially” damaged wa-
termarks, thus again improving robustness against attacks.
However, it can also increase false positives in watermark
extraction, reducing watermark uniqueness. We show later
in this section that the impact on watermark uniqueness can
be tightly bounded by controlling L.
Improvement #5: Addressing Collusion Attacks. Re-
call that for powerful attackers able to match graphs at an in-
dividual node level, they can leverage majority votes across
multiple watermarked graphs to remove watermarks. To de-
fend against this, our insight is to embed watermarks that
have some portion of spatial overlap in the graph, such that
those components will survive majority votes over graphs.
We propose a hierarchical watermark embedding process
to protect watermark(s) against collusion attacks. To build
watermarked graphs for M users, we uniform-randomly di-
vide these M users into 2 groups (a1 and a2) and associate
each group with a public-private key pair < Ka1pub,K
a1
priv >
or < Ka2pub,K
a2
priv >, which is generated and held by the
data owner. We repeat this to produce another group par-
tition and randomly divide M users into 2 groups (b1 and
b2) associated with group key pairs < Kb1pub,Kb1priv > and
< Kb2pub,K
b2
priv > separately. After this step, each user is
assigned to two groups. For example, a user i is assigned to
groups a1 and b2.
To prevent the data owner or users from forging group as-
signments, we modify step 1 in Section 4.1 to achieve an
agreement on group assignments between the data owner
and each user. More specifically, at time T when the data
owner tends to share its graph with a user i assigned to two
groups, e.g. groups a1 and b2, the data owner first send user
i three items: current timestamp T and two group signatures
Ka1priv(T ) andK
b2
priv(T ). User i then validates the two group
signatures using the two group public keys Ka1pub and K
b2
pub.
If the timestamps encrypted using group private keys are T ,
user i agrees the group assignment, saves the three items,
and sends back its personal signature, i.e. Kipriv(T ); oth-
erwise, user i rejects the group assignment. Once the data
owner receives user i’s signature Kipriv(T ), it validates this
timestamp with user i’s public key. If it is valid, the data
owner generates three seeds for user i: Ωi by combining
Kipriv(T ) and KG, Ωa1 by combining K
a1
priv and KG, and
Ωb2 by combining Kb2priv and KG, where KG is graph key
for graphG. Through this agreement scheme, either the data
owner or users can not forge their group assignments. More-
over, since the generated seed for each group is unique, we
can make sure that only one unique watermark corresponds
to each group.
To embed the watermarks for user i, we first follows step
2 − 4 in Section 4.1 to embed two group watermarks using
its two group seeds generated through the above method, i.e.
Ωa1 and Ωb2 in the example. We then use user i’s individ-
ual seed, i.e. Ωi, to embed an individual watermark. When
generating the group watermarks, we make sure that 1) the
group watermark remains the same for users in the same
group; and 2) watermarks corresponding to different groups
do not overlap with each other, or with each user’s individ-
ual watermark graph. Note that because the group and in-
dividual watermarks are generated with different seeds, this
hierarchical embedding process does not affect watermark
uniqueness.
Under this design, a collusion attack can successfully de-
stroy all the watermarks (group or individual) only if the ma-
jority of the watermarked graphs come from different user
groups. Otherwise, the majority vote on raw edges will pre-
serve the “group watermark.” We can compute the success
rate of the attack by the following equation, which repre-
sents the probability that the majority of the graphs obtained
by the attacker come from different user groups:
λ(Ma, J) =

1− J
Ma∑
i=⌈Ma+12 ⌉
(
Ma
i
)
· (
1
J
)i · (
J − 1
J
)Ma−i


2
(3)
where Ma is the number of watermarked graphs obtained by
the attacker and J is the number of groups in each group
partition. The above design chose J = 2 because it min-
imizes λ(Ma, J), ∀Ma. Furthermore, when Ma is odd,
λ(Ma, 2) = 0; and when Ma is even, λ(Ma, 2) is at most
0.25 when Ma = 2. Note that in equation (3) the operation
(.)2 is due to the fact that we group the users twice into two
different group classes: a1, a2 and b1, b2. If we only per-
form the group partition once (e.g. dividing the users into
a1, a2), then λ(2, 2) = 0.5. This means that in practice we
can further reduce λ by performing multiple rounds of group
division (2 in the above design) and adding more group wa-
termarks.
Note that group watermarks contain much less informa-
tion than single user watermarks. In fact, the more robust a
group watermark, the larger granularity (and less precision)
it will provide. Our proposed solution is to extend the sys-
tem by using additional “dimensions,” e.g. go beyond the
two dimensions of a and b mentioned above. Combining
results from multiple dimensions will quickly narrow down
the set of potential users responsible for the leak. However,
since a colluding attack requires the involvement of multi-
ple leakers, even identifying a single leaker is insufficient.
Developing a scheme to reliably detect multiple (ideally all)
colluding users is a topic for future work.
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6.3 Impact on Watermark Uniqueness
To improve the robustness of our watermark system, we
relax the subgraph matching criteria from exact matching to
approximate matching with at most L edge difference. Such
relaxation does not affect watermark detectability because it
does not change the embedding process. However, it may
affect watermark uniqueness, which we will analyze next.
Consider two watermarked graphs GWi and GWj that
were independently generated for user i and j following the
three steps defined in Theorem 1. Let SWi and SWj repre-
sent the embedded watermark graph in GWi and GWj , re-
spectively. To examine the watermark uniqueness, we seek
to compute the probability that a subgraph in GWj differs
from SWi by at most L edges.
Our analysis follows a similar structure of Theorem 1’s
proof. Let EY denote the event where a subgraph of GWj
built on k nodes Y = {y1, y2, ..., yk} only differs from SWi
by at mostL edges. Our goal is to calculate the probability of
the event E = ∪Y EY , which is the union on all combinations
of k nodes. To do so, we first compute the probability of
individual EY .
As shown in Theorem 1, the edges between
(
k
2
)
− (k− 1)
node pairs in SWi are generated randomly with probability
1
2 and are independent ofG
Wj
, while the rest k−1 edges (<
xl, xl+1 >, l = 1...k − 1) are fixed. Thus we can show that
the probability that a subgraphGWj [Y ] differs from SWi by
h edges is upper bounded by 12
e−k+1
·
(
e
h
)
where e =
(
k
2
)
.
Therefore, we can derive the probability of EY as P (EY ) ≤
1
2
e−k+1
·
∑L
h=0
(
e
h
)
. And consequently, we have
P (E) ≤ nk ·
1
2
e−k+1
·
L∑
h=0
(
e
h
)
(4)
where e =
(
k
2
)
, k = (2 + δ)log2n, and n is the node count
of GWj .
Next, given the probability of uniqueness 1 − P (E), we
compute the upper bound on L to ensure 1 − P (E) ≥
0.99999 for all the graphs in Table 1 except Road graphs,
Amazon graphs and P2P network graphs. Again we set
δ = 0.3. The result is listed in Table 3, where the maxi-
mum limit of L varies between 0 and 12. In general, the
larger the graph, the higher the upper bound on L.
7. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate the proposed graph watermarking system us-
ing real network graphs. We consider three key perfor-
mance metrics, false positive, graph distortion and water-
mark robustness. Having analytically quantified the water-
mark uniqueness in Section 5 and 6, we focus on examining
graph distortion and watermark robustness while ensuring
false positive less than 0.001%. We also study the computa-
tional efficiency of the proposed watermark embedding and
extraction schemes.
Experiment Setup. Given the large number of graph
Table 3: Upper bound of L for the 35 network graphs.
Graph Oregon (1) Oregon (2) CAIDA Email arXiv(Enron) (Theo. Cit.)
L Bound 0 1 1 1 1
Graph arXiv arXiv arXiv Patent Slashdot(Phy. Cit.) (Phy.) (Astro) (08/11/06)
L Bound 1 1 1 2 3
Graph Twitter Slashdot Slashdot Slashdot Brightkite(09/02/16) (09/02/21) (09/02/22)
L Bound 3 3 3 3 3
Graph Russia Epinions (1) Google+ Epinions (2) Standford
L Bound 4 4 4 5 5
Graph Email Gowalla BerkStand DBLP NorteDame(Europe)
L Bound 5 5 6 7 7
Graph L.A. London Flickr Wiki Google
L Bound 8 8 8 8 8
Graph Skitter Youtube Pokec arXiv Livejournal(Condense)
L Bound 8 9 9 11 12
Table 4: Percentage of modified nodes and edges after
embedding 5 watermarks into a graph and impact on
graph structure (dK-2 Deviation).
Graph Nodes (%) Edges (%) dK-2 Deviation
Watermarked LA 0.037% 0.033% 0.0008
Watermarked Flickr 0.014% 0.019% 0.0001
computations per data point, we focus our experiments on
two of the larger network graphs listed in Table 1, the LA
regional Facebook graph and the Flickr network graph. The
two graphs have very different sizes and graph structures. To
guarantee less than 0.001% false positive, we select δ = 0.3,
and the k values for the LA and Flickr graphs are 45 and 48,
respectively. For our basic design, we generate 1 watermark
per graph. For our advanced design, we setL to 8, the degree
bucket size to 10, and the NSD similarity threshold to θ =
0.75. For each user, we embed 5 watermarks in its graph,
3 as individual watermarks and 2 as group watermarks. We
chose these settings because they are intuitive and work well
in practice. We leave the optimization of these parameters to
future work.
In the following, we present our experiment results in
terms of 1) amount of distortion introduced to the original
graph due to watermarking, 2) robustness of the watermark
against attacks, and 3) computational efficiency of our wa-
termarking design.
7.1 Graph Distortion from Watermarks
We consider three types of metrics for measuring the
graph distortion from watermarks.
• Modifications to the raw graph – We count the number of
nodes and edges modified by embedding watermarks. In-
tuitively, more modifications to the graph introduce higher
distortion.
• Deviation in the dK-2 distribution – We also measure the
Euclidean distance between the dK-2 series of the original
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Table 5: Graph metrics are consistent w/ and w/o water-
marks.
Graph AS Avg. CC Avg. Deg Avg. Path Dia.
LA Original 0.21 0.19 25.4 4.6 14
Watermarked 0.21 0.19 25.4 4.6 14
Flickr Original -0.02 0.18 18.1 5.3 21
Watermarked -0.02 0.18 18.1 5.3 21
graph and that of the watermarked graphs2. Larger devi-
ation in dK-2 series implies higher distortion to the graph
structure.
• Graph metrics w/ and w/o watermarks – Finally we mea-
sure the commonly used graph metrics before and after the
watermarking, including node degree distribution, assorta-
tivity (AS) [36], clustering coefficient (CC) [36], average
path length and diameter. Any large deviation in any of
these metrics indicates that the watermarked graph experi-
enced large distortion.
We have examined the distortion introduced by both the
basic and advanced designs. We only show the results of the
advanced design because it adds more watermarks and thus
leads to higher distortion. For both LA and Flickr graphs,
we generate 10 different watermarked graphs (using 10 dif-
ferent random generator seeds) and present the average re-
sult across these graphs. Because computing average path
length and diameter on these two large graphs is highly com-
putational intensive, we randomly sample 1000 nodes and
compute the average path length and diameter among them
(following the same approach taken by prior works on social
graph analysis [41]).
Table 4 shows the percentage of modified nodes and edges
by watermarking. Even after embedding 5 watermarks, the
modification is less than 0.04% for LA and 0.02% for Flickr.
These small changes imply little distortion on the water-
marked graphs. This is further confirmed by the average
dK-2 distances for both graphs, 0.0008 for LA and 0.0001
for Flickr, indicating that the watermarked graphs are highly
similar to the original graph.
Table 5 compares the original and watermarked graphs
in terms of five representative graph metrics. Similarly, for
both LA and Flickr, the graph metrics remain the same be-
fore and after watermarking. We also examined the statis-
tical distribution of each metric and found no visible differ-
ence between the graphs.
Together, these results indicate that our proposed wa-
termarking system successfully embeds watermarks into
graphs with negligible impact on graph structure. This is
unsurprising, given the extremely small size of watermarks
relative to the original graphs. Thus we believe watermarked
graphs can replace the originals in graph applications and
produce (near-)identical results.
2The Euclidean distance between two dK-2 series G1 and G2 is defined
by 1
D
√∑
<d1,d2>
(eG1
<d1,d2> − e
G2
<d1,d2>)
2 where D is the number of
< d1, d2 > combinations or entries in the dK-2 series.
7.2 Robustness against Attacks
Next, we investigate how the proposed watermarking sys-
tem performs in the presence of attacks. For each of the two
attack implementations discussed in Section 6.1, we vary the
attack strength and examine the robustness against the attack
as well as the cost of the attack. Specifically, we repeat each
experiment for 10 times, and examine two metrics:
• Robustness – in the single attacker model, the robustness
is quantified as the ratio of graphs from which we can suc-
cessfully extract at least one of the 3 individual watermarks.
In the collusion attack, in addition to this ratio, we also
measure the ratio of graphs where we can extract at least
one of the 5 watermarks (3 individual + 2 group water-
marks).
• Cost of the attack – the normalized distortion produced on
the attacked graph. It represents the Euclidean distance be-
tween the dK-2 series of the attacked graphs and that of
the original graph, normalized by the Euclidean distance
between the dK-2 series of the clean watermarked graphs
and that of the original graph. If the normalized distortion
is larger than 1, the attack introduces more distortion than
embedding the watermarks.
Results on the Single Attacker Model. For the single at-
tacker model, we quantify the attack strength by the number
of modified edges. The robustness and the cost of the attack
are measured as a function of the number of modified edges.
To show how robustness is improved using the improve-
ment mechanisms, we first evaluate the robustness results
in the basic watermark scheme. We run the single attacker
model on the watermarked graphs by varying the number of
modified edge number, and repeat the experiment 10 times.
The robustness here is quantified as the ratio of graphs from
which we can successfully extract the watermark.
Figure 2 shows the robustness of the basic watermark
scheme against the single attacker model. It shows that ran-
domly modifying a small number of edges disrupted the wa-
termark subgraph extraction process. In LA, our basic de-
sign cannot recover the watermark with 100% probability
even when we modify 20 edges. In Flickr, a large graph,
the robustness of the basic scheme reduces to less than 40%
when only 500 edges are modified. In each case, at least
one of the nodes in the watermark subgraph had a modi-
fied NSD label (one of its neighbors’ node degree changed),
and it could not be located in the extraction process. We
also look at the distortion caused by the attack shown in Fig-
ure 3. As expected, the small number of modified edges
causes small distortions in graph structures. For example,
in LA, when the robustness is 0, the distortion is around 3x
more than that caused by embedding the watermark. Both
results show that watermarked graphs generated by the ba-
sic scheme are easily disrupted by even small, single user
attacks.
Figure 4(a)-(b) plot the robustness of watermarked LA
and Flickr graphs generated by the scheme with the improve-
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Figure 2: The robustness of the basic design against the sin-
gle attacker model.
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Figure 3: The distortion caused by the single attacker model
in the basic design.
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Figure 4: The robustness in the improved design against the
single attacker model.
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Figure 5: The distortion caused by the single attacker model
in the improved design.
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Figure 6: The robustness against the collusion attack.
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 1  2  3  4  5  6
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 d
K-
2 
di
st
.
# of graphs
(a) Distortion, LA
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 1  2  3  4  5  6
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 d
K-
2 
di
st
.
# of graphs
(b) Distortion, Flickr
Figure 7: The distortion caused by the collusion attack.
ment mechanisms against the single attacker model. As
expected, the robustness decreases with the attack strength
since more edges are modified to “destroy” watermarks. For
LA, our system maintains 100% robustness up to 230K mod-
ified edges, which is around 400x stronger than the max-
imum attack strength handled in the graph generated by
the basic design. For Flickr, the system can handle at-
tack strength up to 933K modified edges, which is > 400x
stronger than the maximum attack strength in the basic de-
sign. This is because Flickr is larger in size while having a
similar watermark graph size k, so the attacker must modify
more edges to destroy watermarks. On the other hand, re-
sults in Figure 5 show that the cost of these attacks is large.
For Flickr, with more than 1.4M modified edges, an attack
leads to 800x more distortion over that caused by embedding
the watermarks. Together, these results show that our water-
mark system with the improvement mechanisms is highly
robust against single user attacks.
Results on Collusion Attacks. To implement the collu-
sion attack desbribed in Section 6.1, we first generate 10 wa-
termarked graphs and randomly pick Ma graphs from them
as the graphs acquired by the attacker. We vary the number
of graphs obtained by the attacker Ma between 2 to 5. For
each Ma value we repeat the experiments 10 times and re-
port the average value. Since watermarks generated by the
basic design can be easily detected and removed by the pow-
erful collusion attack, here we focus on evaluating the ro-
bustness of the improvement mechanisms.
Figure 6(a)-(b) shows the robustness of the watermarked
LA and Flickr graphs against the collusion attack. Fig-
ure 6(a) shows that in LA, by applying majority votes on
raw edges, the collusion attack can effectively remove all 3
individual watermarks. However, the attack is ineffective in
removing both group watermarks such that we can extract at
least one group watermark in more than 60% of the attacked
graphs. Here the robustness values, deviate slightly from
that projected by Equation (3) because we limit the number
of statistical sampling to 10 runs. Unlike LA, Figure 6(b)
plots that the collusion attack cannot remove all the individ-
ual watermarks in Flickr when using 2 or 3 watermarked
graphs. This is all because the deanonymization method
causes a large portion of nodes mismatched in Flickr ( 30%
nodes). Finally, Figure 7 shows that the collusion attack also
introduce larger distortions in graph structure. This mainly
comes from the mismatch of the deanonymization methods.
These results show that even a powerful collusion attack
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is ineffective in removing all the embedded watermarks.
Moreover, the potential inaccuracy of the deanonymization
method causes the collusion attack even weaker in removing
individual watermarks. Of course, the attackers will even-
tually succeed in disrupting watermarks if they are willing
to modify larger portions of the graph, thus sacrificing the
utility of the graph. While our work provides a robust de-
fense against attackers with relatively low level of tolerance
for graph distortion, we hope follow-on work will develop
more robust defenses against higher distortion attacks.
7.3 Computational Efficiency
Here, we measure the efficiency of the watermarking sys-
tem. There are two components in the watermarking system,
i.e. watermark embedding and watermark extraction. The
time to extract a watermark is the time to run step 2 and 3
in watermark extraction, i.e. candidate selection and water-
mark identification.
To accelerate the extraction process, we parallelize the key
steps across multiple servers. More specifically, in the can-
didate selection step, any available servers are assigned an
unchecked watermark node to find its candidates. In step 3,
each available server will be assigned to search one water-
mark from one candidate of watermark node x1. When a
watermark is found or no more candidates are unchecked,
the extraction process stops (for that user).
We perform measurements to quantify the actual impact
of parallelizing extraction over a cluster. All system param-
eters are the same as previous tests, except that we embed 1
watermark into a graph. To extract watermarks, we compare
the improved watermark extraction method to the basic ex-
traction method, with bucket size 10 and NSD similarity of
0.75 in the improved extraction method. In addition to the
two graphs, i.e. Flickr and LA, we also measure efficiency
on the largest graph in our study (Livejournal, 5.2 million
nodes, 49 million edges), shown in Table 1. We parallelize
watermark extraction across 10 servers, each with 2.33GHz
Xeon servers with 192GB RAM. All experiments repeat on
10 different watermarked graphs, and the time is the average
of the 10 computation time.
First result in Table 6 is that watermarking system is ef-
ficient in embedding and extracting watermarks. On aver-
age, embedding one watermark into a graph is very fast.
For example, average embedding time for the largest graph,
Livejournal, is around 12 minutes and embedding times for
Flickr and L.A. are less than 2 minutes. Even using one
server to extract watermarks, the computation time is small.
Like in Flickr, the extraction time is around 13 minutes using
both the basic method and the improved method. From our
observation, the time to identify the watermark graph on the
candidate subgraphs is much less than the time required to
find and filter candidates, which corresponds to around 99%
of total computation time. Since finding candidates takes
O(kn) computational complexity and k = (2+δ) log2 n, the
complexity to extract a watermark from a real-world graph
Table 6: The efficiency of the watermarking system, in-
cluding watermark embedding time on one server, the
extraction time on one server and the parallel extraction
time across 10 servers using basic watermark extraction
method and improved watermark extraction method.
Graph Embedding (s) Basic Extraction Improved ExtractionSingle(s) Parallel (s) Single (s) Parallel (s)
LA 40 270 39 310 42
Flickr 80 767 195 776 197
Livejournal 695 2568 310 2605 317
is O(n log2 n). Here k is the number of nodes in the water-
mark graph and n is the number of nodes in the total graph.
Second, we find that speedup from distributed extraction
is quite good, with speedup of 8 over 10 servers for Livejour-
nal and 7 for LA (for both extraction methods). The speedup
for Flickr is only around 4 using both methods, because one
of the watermarked graphs takes much longer time than oth-
ers in finding candidates, ∼ 10 minutes. This is almost 4
times longer than the average extraction time on the other
graphs. Not counting this outlier, average parallel extrac-
tion time on Flickr is around 150 seconds for both methods,
which is 5 times faster than using one server. This is because
the core computation is finding candidates, and completion
time can vary when computing the similarity of NSD be-
tween watermark nodes and graphs nodes, which depends
on node degree. The higher the degree is, the longer it takes
for the similarity computation. Since there are several Flickr
watermark nodes of high degree, time to find candidates is
relatively longer.
Finally, comparing the two extraction methods, there is no
significant difference between their computation time. This
is because the extraction time of both methods are dom-
inated by the time to find and filter candidates, which is
O(n log2 n) for both methods.
Summary. We evaluate the efficiency of the graph wa-
termark embedding and extraction algorithms on three real-
world graphs with 600K ∼ 5M nodes and 7M ∼ 48M
edges. The results show that the embedding process is fast
even for large graphs, and only takes up to 12 minutes to em-
bed a watermark into a graph with 5M nodes. In the extrac-
tion process, the time to identify watermark graphs on the
set of pre-filtered candidate nodes is much less than the time
to filter candidate nodes, whose complexity is O(n log2 n).
Our experimental results also show that on a single commod-
ity server, the extraction time is at most 43 minutes in a 5M -
node graph, and can be future reduced to less than 5 minutes
by distributing the computation across multiple servers.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we take a first step towards the design
and implementation of a robust graph watermarking system.
Graph watermarks have the potential to significantly impact
the way graphs are shared and tracked. Our work identifies
the critical requirements of such a system, and provides an
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initial design that targets the critical properties of unique-
ness, robustness to attacks, and minimal distortion to the
graph structure. We also identify key attacks against graph
watermarks, and evaluate them against an improved design
with additional features for improved robustness under at-
tack.
Our evaluation shows that our initial watermarking sys-
tem modifies very few nodes and edges in a graph, i.e. less
than 0.04% nodes and edges in a graph with 603K nodes
and 7.6M edges. Results also demonstrate extremely low
distortion, i.e. the watermarked graphs are highly consis-
tent with the original graph in all graph metrics we consid-
ered. Empirical tests on several real, large graphs show that
our robustness features dramatically improved our resilience
against both single and multi-user collusion attacks. Finally,
we show that the embedding process and the extraction pro-
cess are efficient, and the extraction process is easily paral-
lelized over a computing cluster.
While our proposed scheme achieves many of our initial
goals, there is significant room for improvement and on-
going work. One focus is developing stronger redundancy
schemes to protect against attackers with a greater tolerance
for graph distortion, i.e. willing to make a greater number of
node/edge changes. Another is to develop alternate schemes
that can recover more information about multiple attackers
in the colluding attack model.
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